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LAWYERS AS DIRECTORS
OF CLIENT CORPORATIONS
By M. Thomas Arnold

The lawyer as director of a client corporation is
a multifaceted topic. While not exhaustive of all
issues pertaining to outside counsel serving as
director, my remarks-some of which may be
more relevant in the public corporation context-will focus on two questions. First, what are
the legal implications of board membership for a
lawyer? Second, should lawyers serve on the
boards of client corporations? With respect to the
second question, I will attempt to avoid being
overly dogmatic, hoping instead to impart some
of the flavor of the controversy.

I. A LAWYER AS A DIRECTOR
IS A DIRECTOR
While a logician might tell you that the above
statement is tautological, there is, perhaps, a
moral. A directorship cannot be treated as a
purely honorary position., The lawyer-director is
subject to all the duties and obligations placed
upon directors by state and federal law.

A. OBLIGATIONS OF A DIRECTOR
UNDER STATE LAW
The import of director status under state law includes the imposition of fiduciary status. The
Oklahoma Business Corporation Act expressly
states that directors "stand in a fiduciary relation
to the corporation." 2 The fiduciary duties of a
lawyer-director would prohibit, among other
things, the seizing of corporate opportunities,
competing unfairly with the corporation, dealing
with the corporation on unfair terms and accepting bribes for acting adversely to the corporation's
interests. 3 "[Nione of these prohibited activities
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should trouble any honest director, whether he is
4
a lawyer or non-lawyer."
In addidion, the Oklahoma Business Corporation Act provides that the affairs of the corporation "shall be managed and conducted by a board
of directors." Thus, the director of a corporation
is charged with the duty of managing the corporation, and he or she must do so with "that
diligence, care, and skill which ordinarily prudent
men would exercise under similar circumstances in
like position." 6 This would presumably place an
obligation on the director to keep informed as to
corporate affairs, to attend board and committee
meetings regularly, and to exercise reasonable
business judgment.
The lawyer-director may be held, in some cases,
to a higher standard of care than a layperson. The
Oklahoma Business Corporation Act uses the
phrase "under similar circumstances" in describing
7
the director's duty of care, as does the Model
8
Business Corporation Act. The drafter's comments to the Model Business Corporation Act
state that this phrase "gives recognition to the fact
that the special qualifications a particular director
may possess .

.

.. may place a measure of respon-

sibility upon such director which may differ from
that placed upon another director.""
The lawyer-director should bear in mind,
however, that "[iut is well settled that directors do
not serve as-insurers; they do not guarantee the
company's success." 0 If the rule were otherwise,
capable individuals would be extremely reluctant
to accept directorships. The director is given a
great measure of protection by the business judgment rule" and by the requirement that, to be actionable, failure to exercise appropriate diligence
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and skill in the management of a corporation must
cause injury to the corporation.12
On the other hand, a lawyer-director would be
remiss if overly complacent regarding his or her
duty to exercise care in the management of the affairs of the client corporation. Despite the limited
number of directors held liable in this context,13
one would not wish to be graced with the dubious
distinction of being one of the few.

B. OBLIGATIONS OF A DIRECTOR UNDER

corporation has a charter or bylaw provision dealing with indemnity. It could be more restrictive
than the statute." 2 ' Finally, one commentator has
suggested that "[a] lawyer going on a Board of
Directors should inquire as to whether the corporation has D & 0 insurance and, if not, he
should ask the board to obtain a quotation and
consider such a purchase.""

II. SHOULD LAWYERS BE PROHIBITED
FROM SERVING ON THE BOARDS
OF CLIENT CORPORATIONS?

THE FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS
Very briefly, the lawyer as a director is subject
to all the duties and liabilities imposed on directors by the Securities Act of 1933"4 and the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.15 These would include, for example, the prohibition against trading
on inside information, 16 the obligation to give up
"profits" made on short-swing transactions in
equity securities registered under the 1934 Act,17
the prohibition against short sales of equity
securities registered under the 1934 Act, 18 and the
liability for errors in registration statements utilized in public offerings under the 1933 Act."

C. THE LIMITS OF PROFESSIONAL
LIABILITY INSURANCE
The lawyer considering accepting a directorship
should explore the matters of indemnification and
directors and officers' (D & 0) insurance. Since
the lawyer as a director would be functioning in a
business-as opposed to a professional or
legal-capacity, it is doubtful that his or her professional liability coverage would extend to claims
made against him or her qua director.
Oklahoma-and a number of other states-has
a non-exclusive provision in its Business Corporation Act empowering corporations, subject to certain restrictions, to indemnify corporate directors
for liabilities arising out of their service as directors and authorizing the purchase and
maintenance by corporations of insurance covering claims against directors.20 A lawyer joining the
board of a corporation should inspect the applicable indemnification statute. In addition,
"[wlithout regard to whether the statute is exclusive, [he or she] should determine whether [the]
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Some law firms do prohibit lawyers affiliated
with the firm from serving on the boards of client
corporations." In a Salt Lake City survey, sixteen
percent of the lawyers who responded were with
firms that had adopted such an approach.24 One
problem with a law firm policy prohibiting the acceptance of directorships with client corporations
is that the unilateral adoption of standards of
ethical behavior may have costs if others do not
follow suit. One lawyer relates:
We have a strong policy in our firm ....
against serving as a director where we represent the company more or less generally. And
our experience in one or two instances has
been that the company wanted somebody
from the firm to serve as a director .

. .

. A

prominent lawyer from another law firm was
contacted who said, Yes, he would serve as a
director, but only in the event the company
shifted its business to his law firm. 2 5
Some lawyers purport to deplore the practice of
accepting directorships with client corporations
while continuing to do so.' 6 One commentator,
adopting a more cynical approach than my own,
states:
When the company's chief executive .

...

asks [counsel] to go on the board, it is more
than an invitation; it is a summons into the inner sanctum of management that from
counsel's point of view cements the relationship of his firm to the client, or more precisely, of the firm to management. The invitation could be refused but there is concern not
to affront the valued client, whose understanding of the ethical implications will
presumably be less than his lawyer's .

. ..

Candor, then, requires the conclusion that the
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bar's occasional sensitivity to the issues of
professionalism inherent in the subject has
been dulled by the dollars involved. 27
The Code of Professional Responsibility for
Lawyers as it is now constituted does not prohibit
a lawyer from serving as a director of a client corporation. It has been suggested that the Code be
amended to include just such a prohibition.28
Comparisons have been made between the attorney and the accountant who is proscribed by
the code of ethics of his or her profession from
serving on the board of a client corporation. 29
It has been proffered that "[tihe lawyer is in no
less need of complete independence in the expression of his legal opinion regarding his clients' pro30
grams and actions" than is the accountant. One
question here is whether the lawyer-director is
able to "resist fully the temptation in close cases to
trim his legal opinion to match his affirmative
vote for management proposals."3 1
In addition to concern about the need for independence on the part of outside corporate
counsel, questions have been raised regarding the
effect of board membership on the lawyer's ability
to be taken seriously in his role of counsellor. Professor Mundheim has asked:
If I am prepared to support a course of action as a director, how will that affect my
lawyer's role in

.

. .

. having the other

members of the board take my descriptions of
the [legal] risks seriously and weigh them independently when they know how I am going
2
to vote as a director.3
Even if the other members of the board are able
to take the lawyer-director seriously in both
The Oklahoma Bar Journal

capacities, it is not clear that these dual roles are
separable in the context of a board or committee
meeting. One potential ramification of this is loss
of the attorney-client privilege. For a communication at a board meeting to be privileged in
Oklahoma courts, for example, it must be made
for the "purpose of facilitating the rendition of
legal services."3 3 Thus, it seems the advice must be
solicited from the lawyer-director in his or her
34
capacity as a lawyer and not as a director.
Finally, it has been argued that the lawyer who
serves as a director of a client corporation is in an
inherent conflict of interest situation with regard
to the selection, retention, and payment of his or
her firm as outside counsel.3s
The question of whether the Code should prohibit lawyers from serving as a director of a client
corporation is not, however, one-sided. Many feel
that it would be unwise to amend the Code of Professional Responsibility to include such a proscription.
One argument advanced in favor of this position is simply that lawyers, by virtue of their
training and experience, make good directors.36
Apart from the merits of whether this is true, it is
likely that a client corporation perceives this to be
true. One lawyer has recounted that:
a client recently used the following
argument to urge me to join a board. He said:
'I would like you on the board because I know
if you are on the board you are going to worry
....

I know you will try to do the right

37
thing. So I want you there, worrying.'
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In addition, it is argued that placing corporate
counsel on the board gives him or her an opportunity to practice preventive law. 3 8 Many believe,
as I do, that the lawyer is most successful when he
or she prevents his or her client from getting entangled in the first place.
One lawyer, speaking in favor of counsel serving as director, has stated: "2,000 corporations,
2,000 lawyers and 2,000 law firms can't be
wrong." 3 9 My mother used to respond to my use
of similar logic by asking whether I would put
beans in my ears if everyone else did."o However,
again, there may be a moral. Before the Code of
Professional Responsibility is amended to prohibit
an attorney from accepting a directorship of a
client corporation perhaps we should attempt to
answer two questions. First, what, if anything,
does the corporate management expect to gain
from having counsel as a director? Second, assuming we can ascertain the contemplated benefit,
could it be obtained in a practical sense if outside
counsel were prohibited from joining the board?"4

CONCLUSION
The debate over whether the Code of Professional Responsibility for Lawyers should prohibit
board membership by outside counsel has gone on
for a number of years and can be expected to continue. 4 2 There are certainly compelling arguments
on both sides of the issue. Until such time as a proscription is promulgated, however, lawyers and
firms will have to grapple with the matter at a
more personal level. Those lawyers who decide to
serve as directors for client corporations should be
attentive to their duties, obligations and potential
liabilities under state and federal law.

1. See, e.g., Minton v. Caveaney, 15 Cal. Rptr. 641,
364 P.2d 473, 475-6 (1961), where the court, in referring
to a lawyer-director, stated:
It is immaterial whether or not he accepted the
office of director as an 'accommodation' with the
understanding that he would not exercise any of the
duties of a director. A person may not in this manner divorce responsibilities of a director from the
statutory duties and powers of that office.
Accord, Kavanaugh v. Commonwealth Trust Co., 223
N.Y. 103, 119 N.E. 237, 238 (1918) ("No custom or practice can make a directorship a mere position of honor
void of responsibility .

..

).

2. O.S. tit. 18, §1.34(b) (1971). Absent such an express statement, the result would be the same under
common law principles.
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3. Ruder, "Lawyers as Directors: The Case Against
the Lawyer-Director," 30 Bus. Law. 51, 52 (1975).
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Lawyer-Director," 30 Bus. Law. 58, 59 (1975).
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1924) ("The plaintiff must accept the burden of showing
that the performance of the defendant's duties would
have avoided loss, and what loss it would have
avoided); Litwin v. Allen, 25 N.Y.S.2d 667, 701 (Sup.
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other than what was proximately caused by his own acts
or omissions in breach of his duty.").
13. Professor Bishop has stated that "[tlhe search for
cases in which directors of industrial corporations have
been held liable in derivative suits for negligence uncomplicated by self-dealing is a search for a very small
number of needles in a very large haystack." Bishop,
"Sitting Ducks and Decoy Ducks: New Trends in the Indemnification of Corporate Directors and Officers," 77
Yale L.J. 1078, 1099 (1968).
14. 15 U.S.C.A. §§77a et seq. (1971).
15. 15 U.S.C.A. §§78a et seq. (1971).
16. This prohibition is imposed by Securities Exchange Act §10(b), 15 U.S.C.A. §78j (b) (1971) and
Securities Exhange Commission Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R.
§240.10b-5 (1980), as interpreted by the Securities.Exchange Commission and the federal courts. See In The
Matter of Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961);
S.E.C. v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir.
1968).
17. Securities Exchange Act §16(b), 15 U.S.C.A.
§78p(b) (1971).
18. Securities Exchange Act §16(c), 15 U.S.C.A.
§78p(c) (1971).
19. Securities Act §11, 15 U.S.C.A. §77k (1971).
Recall, in this regard, the travails of defendants Birnbaum (house counsel) and Grant (outside counsel) in the
celebrated case of Escott v. Barchris Construction
Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
20. O.S. tit. 18, §1.43a (1971). This provision is like
Delaware General Corporation Law §145 and Model
Business Corporation Act §5.
21. Schauer, "Lawyers as Directors: Protections Afforded by Indemnification and Insurance," 30 Bus. Law.
47, 48 (1975).
22. Id. at 49. I have not dealt with the question of
whether indemnification of liabilities under the federal
securities laws is against public policy. On this issue, See
Johnston, "Corporate Indemnification and Liability Insurance for Directors and Officers," 33 Bus. Law. 1993,
2007-2009 (1978). The Johnston article is excellent in its
coverage of the topics of indemnification and D & 0 insurance in general.
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23. See, e-g., Cutler, "Ethical Responsibilites of Corporate Lawyers: The Role of the Private Law Firm," 33
Bus. Law. 1549, 1552 (1978) ("With a very few grandfathered exceptions, we forbid any lawyer to become a
director of any corporation for which we act as principal
outside counsel or as securities law counsel.").
24. Note, "Should Lawyers Serve as Directors of Corporations for Which Ther Act as Counsel?." 1978 Utah
L. Rev. 711 at notes 38 & 47.
25. Panel Discussion, "Ethical Responsibilities of Corporate lawyers: Should Code of Professional Responsibility Forbid Lawyers to Serve on Boards of Corporations For Which They Act as Counsel," 33 Bus. Law.
1511, 1517 (1978) (comments of Mr. Wheat).
26. Riger, "The Lawyer Director-"A Vexing Problem," 33 Bus. Law. 2381, 2382 (1978).
27. Id. at 2383.
28. See, e.g., id. at 2387.
29. Id. at 2386.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Mundheim, "Ethical Responsibilities of Corporate
Lawyers: Should Code of Professional Responsibility
Forbid Lawyers to Serve on Boards of Corporations For
Which They Act as Counsel," 33 Bus. Law. 1507, 1509
(1978).
33. O.S. tit. 12, §2502(B) (1980 supp.).
34.See Note, supra note 24 at 718-721 & 732-738, for
more indepth discussion of this issue.
35. It has been suggested that "[i]n view of the
fiduciary relationship owed by the lawyer-director, the
fees charged by his firm should be carefully scrutinized
for fairness." Ruder, supra note 3 at 54. I concur
wholeheartedly with this suggestion if for no other
reason than it makes good business sense. I question,
however, the assertion that "[elven the selection of the
lawyer-director's law firm to perform services for the
corporation may be subject to challenge." Id. Statutory
provisions such as O.S. tit. 18, §1.175(a) (1980 supp.)
would seem to provide a means to avoid such a result.
36. Harris, supra note 4, at 58.
37. Panel Discussion, supra note 25, at 1513 (comments of Mr. Bialkin).

38. Note, supra note 24, at 723-725.
39. Harris, supra note 4, at 58-59, referring to
statistics that indicated that approximately 2,000
publically held corporations had directors who were affiliated with law firms employed as outside counsel.
40. Of course, when I was eight years old, the answer
was yes.
41. Mundheim, supra note 32, at 1510 states:
A final consideration which I think one ought to
weigh is whether a rule prohibiting general counsel
from serving on the boards of client companies will,
as a practical matter, stop lawyers from serving on
boards. I would not consider that a desirable result.
Will an individual who is a lawyer but does not
have a lawyer relationship with X company be willing to go on its board if he knows that doing so will
bar him or his firm from doing substantial legal
work for the company-or do so while he is on the
board.
42. For example, the proposed ABA Model Rules of
Professional Conduct provide:
(f) A lawyer may serve as general counsel to a corporation or other organization of which the lawyer
is a director only if:
(1) there is adequate disclosure to and consent
by all persons having an investment interest in
the organization; or
(2) when doing so would not involve serious
risk of conflict between the lawyer's responsibilities as general counsel and those as director.
DiscussioN DRAFT OF

ABA

MODEL RULES OF PROFES-

Rule 1.9(f), reprinted in, 48 U.S.L.W.
1, at 8 (Feb. 19, 1980 special ed.).
The Comment to this Rule states that "it is often
useful that a lawyer serve both as counsel to an
organization and as one of its directors. When the risk of
compromising the independence of counsel is remote, it
is not improper that counsel be a member of the board."
Comment to Rule 1.9, Id. at 9. The proposed Rule seems
destined to insure that discussion of this issue will not
abate.
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Rominations Reeded
by October Pt for the
following awards
1.

2.

3.

4.

Two outstanding county bar associations
for efforts and activities in improvement of
the legal profession, in community services
and public relations.

tion of justice or service to the Oklahoma
Bar Association.
6.

The Hicks Epton Award in honor of
former OBA President Hicks Epton, the inventor of Law Day, for noteworthy Law
Day programs conducted by individuals or
groups either lawyer or lay.

The Half Century Award to those members
of the Oklahoma Bar Association who
have served their profession 50 years.

7.

The Outstanding Young Lawyer Award to
members of the Oklahoma Bar Association
under 36 years of age who have rendered
meritorious service to their profession.

The Golden Gavel Award to those OBA
committees performing with a high degree
of excellence.

8.

Earl Sneed Award (CLE contribution).

9.

Inventor of year; said recipient to be
chosen by the OBA Patent, Trademark and
Copyright Law Section.

The Maurice Merrill Essay Award in two
categories, to-wit:
a.

The high school student writing the
best Law Day essay; said award to

10.

Outstanding lawyer practicing 50 years or
longer.

11.

Outstanding lawyer practicing less than 50
years.

carry with it a $100.00 cash prize.
b.

5.
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To the author of the best published
contribution to the Oklahoma Bar
Quarterly; said recipient to be chosen
by the Board of Editors of the
Oklahoma Bar Journal, to be known as
the Maurice Merrill Golden Quill
Award.
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OBA Awards Committee, Oklahoma Bar
Association, 1901 North Lincoln Boulevard, P.O.
Box 53036, Oklahoma City, Okla. 73152, on or
before October 1, 1981.

The Liberty Bell Award to individuals or
groups, either lawyers or lay, and the news
media for contributions to the administra-
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